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Appeal to intuitions about cases is central to the methodology of all branches of contemporary philosophy.  It does not take much to be convinced of this; we need only remember Havit and his American car, Truetemp, zombies, Twin Earths and barns.  Traditionally, philosophy has regarded these intuitions as fairly unanimous and self-evidently true and thus as solid evidence points for theorising.  Saul Kripke famously said “some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it.  I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself.  I really don’t know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have about anything” (1980, 54).  In the last decade or so, though, this appeal to intuition has been prominently attacked by experimental philosophers led by Stephen Stich and Jonathan Weinberg.  They have taken philosophers at their word and investigated whether the intuitions they appeal to are in fact unanimous and self-evidently true or whether it is all a rouse.  Some of their results have been quite surprising and have raised very important issues about philosophical methodology.

It is not the experimentalists with whom I am most concerned here though.  I will be discussing an older but I think deeper objection to the use of intuitions: the explanationist objection.  Made famous by Harman in his The Nature of Morality, this objection challenges intuitionists to explain the justification for their belief in real moral facts.  We can, he claims, explain our “moral observations” perfectly adequately without reference to moral facts.  Rather, we only need to refer to a person’s tacitly-accepted set of moral principles which are unconsciously applied to particular cases and we have an adequate explanation of the moral intuitions (Harman 1977, 7).  Harman thus challenges the moral intuitionist by a naturalistic abduction.  

The argument, as Pust reconstructs it, looks like this:
[1]	Aside from propositions describing the occurrence of her judgements​[1]​,​[2]​, S is justified in believing only those propositions which are part of the best explanation of S’s making the judgements that she makes.

[2]	Moral propositions are not required by the best explanation of S’s making the observational or intuitive judgements that she makes.

[3]	S is not justified in believing any moral propositions (From [1] and [2]).  (Pust 2000, 58-59)

Importantly, Pust points out that we find the same structure of argument in Goldman about metaphysical intuitions.  The argument is amended thus:
[2']	S’s intuitings about metaphysical topic X (and the rest of S’s intuitings and observings) can be best explained without appeal to propositions about X.

[3']	S is not justified in believing any propositions about X (From [1] and [2']).  (Pust 2000, 64)

Goldman suggests that we can explain the occurrence of our metaphysical intuitions by purely psychological factors in the same way that we can explain moral intuitions (1989, 46; 1992, 61).  We might consider the methodology similar to the way that an atheist can explain the occurrence of a theist’s religious experience by psychological and cultural factors.  I cannot thoroughly evaluate these explanations here, nor can I discuss what exactly is meant by a good explanation.  I take it that any reasonable explanation will privilege causally and counterfactually relevant factors over non-causal factors, and this mild naturalism is all I need​[3]​.  In any case, the interesting arguments do not turn on the specifics of these accounts. 





Recent experimental philosophy has been almost exclusively interested in testing the distribution of intuitions about what we may see as conceptual analysis.  Certainly, all the experiments I have come across have tested these intuitions.  Machery et al, for example, discuss intuitions about causal-historical and descriptive theories of reference (2004), Swain et al internalism and externalism in epistemology (2008) and Nichols and Knobe compatibilism and incompatibilism for moral responsibility (2007).  Of course, I do not want to make the strong claim that all those who work in these areas consider themselves to be doing conceptual analysis.  Indeed, we are warned by Sosa that this view is “deplorably misleading” and that many of these debates should be considered to be about something “more objective than just our individual or shared concepts of the relevant phenomena” (2007b, 59).  I consider it to be charitable to interpret them as about conceptual analysis, as will become clear, but if the intuitions are taken to be about something other than concepts, call them “metaphysical” for convenience, then we shall have to wait until the next section for the relevant discussion.

Before I discuss conceptual intuitions, I should briefly outline what I take philosophical intuitions​[4]​ to be.  There has been an enormous amount of work done on the metaphysics of intuitions and most of it is irrelevant to the topic under discussion here.  I follow Bealer’s general model which is the most influential.  He suggests that intuitions are non-inferential intellectual seemings: they seem obvious to the intuiter but are not dependent directly on sensation or reflection.  Further, they are to be distinguished from beliefs, guesses, hunches, judgements and common sense.  And finally, they are fallible (Bealer 1992, 101-104).  There are many other distinguishing factors which could be added, but to do so would only make this account unnecessarily controversial.  In any case, we can easily recognise the appropriate sorts of intuitions by reflecting on the discussions mentioned at the beginning.

There is one other important distinction to make between different types of intuition: surface and robust intuitions.  Surface intuitions are perhaps little better than guesses and represent our first reactions to a case.  At this end of the continuum, we find the more commonsensical and generally conservative intuitions.  Robust intuitions, however, reflect competence and carefulness of reflection and a distinct effort to put oneself out of reach of common errors and biases (Jackson 2008; Kauppinen 2007).  Fully robust intuitions, of course, are merely ideal and are perhaps never encountered in the actual philosophical world, but the interesting normative question is which kind we should pursue in our theorising.  Kauppinen has made convincing arguments that only robust intuitions provide evidence of individual or shared concepts.  He suggests that philosophers are not concerned with surface intuitions because they too often reflect a superficial or mistaken understanding of concepts, especially of the sophisticated concepts of interest to philosophy.  Rather, we aim for robust intuitions of the conceptual norms which prevail in the linguistic community​[5]​.  Those in the community commit to these norms even if they do not acknowledge it and sometimes make mistakes in usage.  Analogously, we commit to the norms of addition, even though many people forget to carry units in complex addition.  Once this is pointed out, the mediocre adder will acknowledge the mistake and correct it rather than maintaining that he was following a different norm.  Given that we seek these norms, Kauppinen argues that we cannot rely on experimental surveys to tell us anything philosophically interesting as they can only reveal surface intuitions.  Rather, we, as careful philosophers, should engage in dialogue and reflection on our use of the concept in our years as members of the linguistic community.  This, he claims, is the surest route to robust intuitions.  Of course, surveys may provide, as indeed they have, stimulus for this reflection, but they are of no value in themselves for investigating our individual or social concepts. 

The argument for the use of robust intuitions is certainly convincing, but we cannot simply assume that all members of the linguistic community use words and concepts in the same way, indeed there may be diverse concurrent norms guiding usage.  If Kauppinen is right and we cannot discover these norms by straightforward empirical research then we should treat this diversity as a serious possibility until more sophisticated experiments can be performed.  Thus, it is epistemically prudent to analyse personal concepts first and then derive public concepts from these if we come to discover sufficient agreement.

If this is the case, we should be appealing to robust intuitions about cases in the hope of illuminating our personal psychological concepts.  I do not mean ‘concept’ here to have any special technical meaning, because currently our science is not developed enough to fully understand meaning storage.  Rather, I follow Goldman and Pust in suggesting that “Jones’s concept of apple is the psychological structure that underlies her deployment of the predicate ‘apple,’ and Jones’s concept of knowledge is the psychological structure that underlies her deployment of the predicate ‘knows’ (or ‘has knowledge’)” (1998, 188).  So, we are investigating whatever it is that turns out to underlie that deployment.  Perhaps not all concepts need be tied this intimately to language, but it seems that the main concepts of philosophical interest are.  Neither need these concepts be of the traditional necessary-and-sufficient-condition form.  The more psychologically respectable exemplar theory, where the application of concepts is determined by allowable similarities to a set of exemplars (Kornblith 2007, 42; Stich and Weinberg 2001, 639), is just as amenable to conceptual analysis; we are, by considering various cases, determining the limits of the allowable variation and the character of the exemplars​[6]​.  

It is admitted by nearly all parties that a good explanation of the occurrence of our intuitions is the existence and content of some personal psychological concept.  Goldman and Pust say “although we do not currently know the precise causal route that connects concept structures with their conscious manifestations, it is extremely plausible, from any reasonable cognitive-science perspective, that there should be such a causal route.”  Because of this, they declare that we can make a justified abductive inference from intuitions to concepts (1998, 188-189).  Williamson suggests “[p]erhaps intuitions about thought and language have a special epistemic status, because they help to constitute their own subject matter” (2004, 119).  Even Ross et al, certainly no friends of intuition, agree that intuitions can be useful for what they call “introspective anthropology” (2007, 14).  It seems, then, that by the explanationist criterion we are justified in believing in the existence of concepts with the content of our philosophical intuitions and we are justified in these beliefs by the very occurrence of those intuitions.  Further, it is methodologically useful to elicit intuitions about cases because it illuminates our concepts​[7]​.

Illuminating concepts is a philosophically respectable and interesting task.  It allows us to develop concepts with independent interest which are perhaps applicable elsewhere in philosophy or scholarship.  We can compare our concepts with each other’s and with natural science to assess the contingency of our intuitive understandings.  Perhaps we can find reasons for our application of a concept which will persuade a wider audience into adopting that concept​[8]​.  In a more self-indulgent way, we can come to understand our own linguistic and conceptual schema in the same way that Lenman suggests we can use ethical inquiry to gain understanding of our moral sensibility (2007, 70).  And, by this understanding, we can suggest improvements in metaphysics and epistemology coming from new developments in philosophy and the natural sciences while still talking to the folk about knowledge or matter in the sense in which we ordinarily talk about it.





I suggested above that we can charitably interpret some philosophers as doing conceptual analysis when discussing ethics or epistemology.  It is more difficult to maintain this position when it comes to much metaphysics.  I am sure this point does not require much pressing either but let us take one example from Ned Markosian​[9]​.  In defending mereological atomism, the claim that there is a bottom level to reality composed of simples, he says “even if the empirical evidence does not support Mereological Atomism, there is nevertheless good a priori evidence for the thesis” (2005, 72 fn. 74).  We cannot interpret this to be about our concept of reality or simplicity or fundamentality​[10]​.  It is plainly a claim about the world.  But to find out about the world, he suggests that we use our intuitions about cases, which provide good a priori evidence for the thesis.  Indeed, Markosian makes the strong claim that this evidence outweighs our empirical evidence​[11]​.  

The explanationist should regard Markosian as unjustified.  The relevant question to ask is: what is the best explanation of our having the metaphysical intuitions that we have?  Well, a factor will better explain a phenomenon if it is causally relevant to that phenomenon.  But it is unclear how most metaphysical entities, fundamental simples included, could cause our intuitions about them.  By what possible mechanism could our intuition contact with the relevant entities in a way which allows it to discriminate between empirically equivalent, or nearly equivalent, theories?  If mereological atomism were true, what kind of explanation would that fact be of our having the relevant intuitions?  Only a very weak one.  Without any sufficiently discriminating causal connection or mechanism known, the explanation can be speculative at best.  

Further, we have no reason to suppose that evolution endowed us with any special capacity for accurate metaphysical theorising (Ross et al. 2007).  Proficiency at social games, reliability in predicting behaviour of individuals and medium-sized objects and skills at navigating certain domains would certainly have increased our ancestors’ reproductive advantage.  There is absolutely no reason, however, to think that having reliable intuitions about the large- or small-scale structure of the immediate environment or about far-off actual or possible worlds would have been at all to their advantage.

A much better explanation for the occurrence of these intuitions can be provided by psychology and cognitive science.  Of course, I cannot give an adequate account here, but it will be of a broadly similar kind to that accepted above for conceptual intuitions.  We have, through social and natural forces, acquired concepts which guide our daily life.  These concepts are very useful and adequately serve our practical and social needs.  In fulfilling these functions, they issue in intuitions about cases.  For example, Lakoff and Johnson have discovered by linguistic analysis a habitual metaphysics of English speakers.  They suggest that we have an implicit doctrine of “containment” where we imagine the world as a kind of container bearing objects that change location and properties over time.  These objects cause things to happen by directly interacting with one another (1980).  We can see how such a metaphor would be convenient for our goings-about the world.  There seems much to recommend the explanation which posits these concepts as the source of our intuitions and not the outside world itself.  The same empirical evidence which supported the above conclusion about conceptual intuitions is available to it.  It is widely accepted that our intuitions can give us evidence about our concepts, and we have no reason to believe they cannot give us evidence about our metaphysical concepts as well.  So this explanation has the advantage of accepted causal connections, while the explanation which invokes metaphysical facts does not.  Of course, the former explanation also has simplicity and parsimony on its side.  Further, we have very good reasons to believe that the metaphysical facts to which many metaphysicians refer in explaining their intuitions are not facts at all.  An examination of contemporary science finds much metaphysical theorising false and since explanations must be true, at least in their most general claims, we have good reason to think these metaphysical theories do not explain anything at all (Ross et al. 2007).  If we accept the psychological explanation, though, we have no reason whatsoever to regard our metaphysical intuitions as evidence for facts about the outside world.  We may use them as evidence only for our concepts and a descriptive folk metaphysics. 





The first objection, most powerfully argued for by Pust (2004), depends on the content of philosophical intuitions to attempt to show that the need for explanation as conceived of by the explanationist is not universal​[13]​.  Since the “proper domain for philosophical uses of intuition” is modal propositions (Sosa 2007a, 101), and since it is often thought that necessities and possibilities are necessarily necessary and possible, this objection contends that our philosophical intuitions are about propositions which, if true, are necessarily true.  But if this is so, we cannot establish any substantive modal connection between the necessary truths and our intuitions because this would require counterfactuals whose antecedents are negated necessary truths.  But, according to the objection, counterfactuals of this kind are intuitively deviant because uniformly and vacuously true.  Thus, we can make little sense of the truth-makers of necessary propositions being causally or counterfactually implicated in the explanation of anything (Pust 2004, 74).  Methods we use to determine explanatory relevance within the realm of contingent propositions simply have no application to necessary propositions.

But, this objection holds, we have prima facie justification for believing the content of our intuitions and thus for believing the reliability of the intuitive mechanism​[14]​.  Since we cannot appeal to the truth-makers of necessary propositions to explain this reliability, Pust asks “why cannot an explanation of the reliability of our intuitions regarding necessary truth consist entirely of a causal explanation of the existence of those very intuitions, an explanation having nothing to do with the truths grasped through those intuitions?” (2004, 76).  He suggests that because our intuitions have as their contents propositions which we are prima facie justified in believing are necessarily true, the reliability of those intuitions “comes for free” (2004, 85).  “[I]f there is an explanation of the fact that we have experiences or intuitions with various contents, that explanation suffices, in conjunction with our justification for thinking the contents true, as an explanation of the reliable belief based upon such evidence” (2004, 86).  

The important claim here for my argument is that we are prima facie justified in believing propositions which fall outside the best explanation of the occurrence of our judgements, namely the content of our intuitions.  We require no explanation which connects them to the truth-makers of the propositions they express for us to be justified in believing those propositions.

This proposal is clearly too weak.  It allows us to explain the reliability of any number of judgement-producing mechanisms​[15]​ by appeal to the explanation for their own existence.  Consider Norman who sells his services as a clairvoyant.  He is a sincere clairvoyant who earnestly believes that he can discover truths by this gift and, by purest luck and convenient equivocation, he has been mostly correct.  One day he has an experience that convinces him that 137+286=423.  Because of this experience, and without bothering to check, he believes this necessary truth.  I take it that Norman’s faculty is relevantly similar to intuition.  (Indeed, this is a bit generous since the reliability of intuition is what is currently under examination.)  Why, then, can Norman not explain the reliability of his clairvoyance by appeal to the psychological facts which led to his claim?  For example, we may explain it by pointing out that he unconsciously loves the number 423 and every time he is asked a mathematical question whose answer his basic skills tell him is around 400, he earnestly proclaims the answer to be 423.  Of course, such an opportunity occurs quite infrequently and so this proclivity does not greatly affect his reliability.  We should remember that the situation here is relevantly similar to metaphysical intuition which, it has been claimed, can result from innate or unconscious aesthetic and pragmatic preferences.  It does not seem, then, that a psychological explanation of the reliability Norman’s clairvoyance is any worse than a psychological explanation of the reliability of metaphysical intuition.  But the psychological explanation of Norman’s clairvoyance is very unimpressive and gives us no reason to think that his next claim will be any more likely true than false.  Even if he has come, by this mechanism, to believe propositions we are prima facie justified in believing, there is no reason at all to think his judgement-forming mechanism is any more reliable than guessing.  But if it is unsatisfying to explain the reliability of Norman’s clairvoyance by this method, it is equally unsatisfying to explain the reliability of metaphysical intuition.

Indeed, so far as I can see, we have no reason even to believe in the reliability of metaphysical intuition.  Pust has taken this for granted in attempting to account for it (2004, 84), but his justification is not at all convincing.  He argues that, like all basic judgement-producing mechanisms, intuition cannot be justified by an argument which does not use the source in question, for to what can we appeal more basic than a basic mechanism?  “[W]hat is sought,” he suggests, “is an entirely independent reason to think that various necessary truths are both necessary and true. How could some other faculty provide that?” (Pust 2004, 85).  

I am quite sure that it is true that no basic judgement-producing mechanism can be non-circularly justified, but for this to be taken as anything like a sufficient condition for justification is absurd.  The reliability of guesses also cannot be non-circularly justified.  But perhaps this is not a basic judgement-forming mechanism.  Surely, though, religious feeling is.  I suspect people have been trusting their religious feelings for longer than their philosophical intuitions and many people trust the former more than the latter now as well.  But surely guessing and religious belief cannot be justified simply because they admit of no non-circular argument.  That we cannot find a non-circular justification for any of our basic judgement-forming mechanisms is a fact of our epistemic condition, not an argument in favour of any such mechanism.

Rather, we must find other ways to differentiate between judgement-producing mechanisms.  The most obvious way for the explanationist to differentiate mechanisms is by their tendency to produce justified beliefs.  A mechanism which constantly issues in judgements about propositions which are part of the best explanation of the occurrence of the agent’s judgements is a reliable mechanism and one which does not is not.  We should believe the products of a reliable mechanism because beliefs based on those products tend to be justified​[16]​.

My argument so far has suggested that a mechanism which produces metaphysical intuitions is not a reliable mechanism in this sense.  The contents of metaphysical intuitions are not part of the best explanation for our having those intuitions.  Thus, beliefs based on metaphysical intuitions are not even prima facie justified.  On the other hand, the mechanism which produces conceptual intuitions is reliable.  We should believe its outputs because they tend to be part of the best explanation for our judgements.  I take it that some other basic judgement-producing mechanisms are reliable as well – sense perception and testimony seem good candidates, clairvoyance and guessing are not.





The second objection shows the real strength of my account.  It has a much longer history than the previous objection and seems at first a much deeper problem for the intuition skeptic.  It was first articulated by Bealer and this account has obviously been very influential.  He notices that empiricists and, we might add, almost all skeptics about intuition, rely on a range of intuitions in their own arguments.  For example, he asks “Why count sense perception as observation?  Why not count memory as observation?  … Indeed why not count intuitions as sense experiences?” (1992, 105).  But how can we make discriminations about observation and experience without appeal to intuitive judgements about these concepts?  Further, he notices that empiricists use words like ‘justified,’ ‘simplest’ and ‘theory’ in the formulation of their argument (1992, 120).  Of course, I do too.  But surely we rely on intuition to understand and analyse these terms.  They cannot be straightforwardly scientifically examined, at least certainly not before we have any understanding of the concepts themselves.  Thus, if the skeptic about intuition’s arguments are successful, the justification for a necessary support for the argument is destroyed as well.  By arguing in this way, the skeptic about intuition has undermined her own argument and thus her position is methodologically and epistemically self-defeating.

But this is far too quick.  We should ask how we are to interpret Bealer’s objection in the light of the distinction between metaphysical and conceptual intuitions I made above.  Of course it would be inconsistent for a naturalist to reject the use of intuition while relying for her argument on that very type of intuition which she is currently objecting to.  But that is not at all what the naturalist should do.  And that is what I have tried carefully to avoid.  

The naturalist may rely on intuition to determine which cases are justified and which are not because these intuitions are conceptual intuitions and not metaphysical intuitions.  If the naturalist declares that intuition is not observation, she should be interpreted as claiming that intuition does not fall within the extension of her concept of observation, not that intuition is really metaphysically not observation (whatever that means).  Since, as I have established, the existence and content of concepts are part of the best explanation for the occurrence of conceptual intuitions, we are justified in believing in these concepts on the basis of those intuitions​[17]​.  Thus, we are justified in believing that the concepts have the content which our intuitions indicate that they do and so we are justified in believing that intuition is not observation.  The naturalist uses conceptual intuitions to undermine metaphysical intuition, and there is nothing self-undermining about that.

Of course, I should be careful not to overstate the case.  Which cases are and are not justified on this view is relative to the agent’s concepts.  Just those cases which fall under the concept of justification will be justified for that agent.  In particular, whether premise [1] of the skeptical argument is a criterion for justification will depend on the agent’s concept of justification.  If it does satisfy the agent’s concept, then he will have a perfectly coherent method for denying that metaphysical intuitions have even prima facie justification even though he has used conceptual intuition to analyse his concept.

This still leaves the defender of metaphysical intuition able to simply declare that by his concept of justification, metaphysical intuition is justified and so he is justified in using it in his theorising​[18]​.  At base I cannot argue with that and indeed I take it that, if his analysis of his concept of justification is sufficiently rigorous, he is justified, by his lights, in using intuition in that way.  If a genuine stalemate arises​[19]​, we may simply say that we are using ‘justification’ in different ways and leave it at that.  There are, however, reasons which we can adduce to encourage the defender to change his usage of ‘justification’ to be more in line with the skeptic.  





While conceptual intuitions have been the main focus of iconoclasm for experimental philosophers and naturalists, I have suggested that these are quite respectable when compared to metaphysical intuitions.  The facts to which conceptual intuitions refer are part of the best explanation for their occurrence, and thus our having a conceptual intuition is justification for believing that we possess a concept with the content of that intuition.  These concepts are to be initially conceived of as personal psychological concepts.  Any expansion of the distribution of the concept must be allowed by empirical data.  Still, the analysis of our personal and shared concepts is of philosophical interest and worth, not least for assessing the justification for various sources of evidence.  

The best explanation of the occurrence of our metaphysical intuitions, however, refers only to psychological factors.  Not only is this a simpler and more parsimonious explanation, but it is supported by scientifically plausible causal connections where the connection between metaphysical facts and metaphysical intuitions is mysterious at best.  I have claimed that a connection between the intuition and the fact is required even for necessary truths.  Thus, I have argued, we are not justified, not even prima facie, in believing propositions based on metaphysical intuition, apart from propositions about those judgements themselves and propositions about metaphysical concepts behind the intuitions.  Importantly, such a position does not undermine itself methodologically or epistemically.  It does not rely on the very same type of intuition which it denounces.  Rather, the argument is supported by beliefs based on intuitions about concepts.  The explanationist criterion declares this kind of belief justified and so we are free to use it in any argument, including arguments about other types of intuition.  The long-standing objection fails and the skeptic about metaphysical intuition is safe.

This does not mean that I am committed to there being no use at all for metaphysical intuition in philosophy.  Like scientific and economic intuition, there is a place for metaphysical intuition in the initial process of idea-gathering and experimental design.  We may have an intuition that fundamental reality is composed of simples and this gives us an incentive to examine that issue.  These intuitions are distinct from any evidence for that position, but still retain some interest and usefulness.  This is a position which brings philosophical methodology closer to scientific methodology and that is, I think, something we should welcome.
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^1	 	 This first clause is necessary to allow justification for ‘explained unexplainers’ which receive justification simply for being judgements.  On pain of infinite regress, each explanatory sequence must have an end proposition which provides no explanation.  I will not be discussing these end propositions so where my discussions below do not specifically include this caveat, it should be read as implicit.  While it may seem that this clause presupposes a justly-criticised operational standard of evidence, where we are taken to have infallible access to evidence at some level which we can use to ensure we construct our belief systems in a justified way (see Williamson 2004, 118-121; 2008), this does not have to be the case.  We may say that we have some epistemic privilege in our access to our own judgements over our access to other things.  This epistemic privilege gives us reason to trust that judgements occur when we think they do, though we are by no means infallible in this.
^2	 	 For beliefs based on perception, the situation is a bit complex.  Some of these beliefs are surely based on absent-minded perceptual experience about which we do not make an immediate judgement.  It seems that either we are required to allow this perception as a form of ‘judgement’ in order to fit it under this argument or that we must regard our later judgements about that perceptual experience as the real judgement which must be explained.  For example, I stare blankly at a green wall while listening to a talk.  Of course, since I am listening to the talk I do not make conscious judgements about the wall’s colour.  Nevertheless, I come later to believe that the wall is green.  I take it that this belief is justified, but the question is how.  It seems that we may either regard the initial absent-minded perception as a form of ‘judgement’ or we may regard the realisation that I had been seeing a green wall as the judgement in question.  I prefer the latter, but the choice makes no difference to the overall argument.
^3	 	 Causally and counterfactually relevant factors are usually given to us by controlled uses of our senses.  There is no prohibition on using other sources of evidence, even intuition, to arrive at this relevance, though, so long as that source is capable of showing such relevance.  Arguments presented below suggest that intuition cannot establish such relevance because its primary domain is purported necessary truths about which we cannot determine counterfactual dependence.  Additionally, while intuition can provide us with intuitively plausible causal factors and mechanisms for many systems, it cannot provide an intuitively plausible mechanism which connects metaphysical intuitions to the extra-mental entities which are the content of those intuitions.  Since no other source of evidence provides this connection either, we have no reason to think such a connection exists and thus no reason to think that metaphysical intuition can provide us with evidence of causally relevant factors.  See below for details of metaphysical intuition and the need for a connection.
^4	 	 Throughout, I will refer to both the mechanism which produces intuitions and the outputs of that mechanism as ‘intuition.’  I am sure context will disambiguate, but the mechanism will usually be in the singular and the outputs in the plural.
^5	 	We may see what looks to be a tension here between the cleaned-up, consciously-pruned robust intuition and the 'intuitiony' phenomenology of intuition.  Intuitions are non-inferential seemings and attempts to rattle and shake them seem to reduce this spontaneity.  I think is a mistake, though.  The process of debate and reflection is an attempt to remove the irrelevant factors which could be influencing the phenomenology of the surface intuition in order to see whether any intuitive content remains.  We are looking for a situation where, after the bias and rashness are removed, we are left with a core intuition which retains the 'intuitiony' phenomenology and counts as a non-inferential seeming though conscious work has been done to clean it up.
^6	 	 It is perhaps interesting that psychologists themselves recommend and practise conceptual analysis (Machado and Silva 2007).  Admittedly, they are analysing technical concepts, but these psychologists do not sneer at analysing concepts into their meanings and relations to other concepts.  Jackson suggests that analyzing technical concepts is also part of philosophical conceptual analysis (Jackson 2001).
^7	 	 For externalists about the content of mental states, we can at least admit that we can illuminate any part of the concept which is determined internally.
^8	 	 This adoption need not be completely voluntary.  Perhaps because of some other commitments or reasonings, the person feels psychologically compelled to adopt the other concept.  This is a complex issue and I do not want to defend anything stronger here than the claim that this application of the concept may become more psychologically compelling to others.
^9	 	 See also Ross et al for a fiery criticism of much intuition-based metaphysics (2007, 1-15).
^10	 	 Or rather, we can interpret it in this way, but to do so would be to ignore his express wishes for interpretation.  If we were to be charitable, according to my standards, we could regard almost all uses of metaphysical intuition as ambiguous between claims about the world and claims about our metaphysical concepts and prefer to interpret them as the latter.  Of course, in many cases this would be to disregard the realist interpretation the writer herself gives and thus may be a little disingenuous, but the fact that most of the structure of metaphysical theorizing can be salvaged, even if the content must perish, should count in favour of my account.
^11	 	 Markosian fulfils the description provided by Daniel Dennett better than most: “They [metaphysicians] have proceeded as if the deliverances of their brute intuitions were not just axiomatic-for-the-sake-of-the-project but true, and, moreover, somehow inviolable” (2005, 34)
^12	 	 Though see, for example, (Sturgeon 1984).
^13	 	 Grundmann (2007) makes a similar argument, though is less clear about its implications.  He argues that “the modal tie between our reasons and the truth-makers, which is essential for reliability, can obtain even if it cannot be explained by any influence, interaction or relation of dependence between them.” 
^14	 	 Pust assumes that there is a reasonably coherent intuitive mechanism, perhaps suggesting that he is an anti-reductionist about intuition.  While sometimes he and others who make this argument sound rather like they are appealing to a mysterious faculty of intuition, I will assume here that philosophical intuitions are phenomenologically and theoretically distinctive enough that a mechanism is discernible, even if it is only that part of some other mechanism which has produced our intuitions up until now.
^15	 	 I call these judgement-producing mechanisms rather than the more natural belief-producing mechanisms because they do not, strictly speaking, produce beliefs.  Intuitions, as has been pointed out, are not beliefs and it seems that we can, and many do, withhold belief from intuitively plausible propositions.  A judgement-producing mechanism is any mechanism which causes us to make a judgement, whether or not we believe the contents of that judgement.
^16	 	 I think Weinberg’s suggestion that “hopefulness” is the distinguishing feature between trustworthy and untrustworthy basic sources of evidence is also of interest and use to the naturalist (2007).  Hopeful sources, and hopeful practices which use those sources, have the ability to correct and detect their errors.  Factors which contribute to hopefulness are: external corroboration of data; internal coherence; and detectability of margins, which is especially helped by a rich enough sensation so that our practices can become sensitive to unfavourable conditions.  Theoretical illumination of the mechanism by which the source connects to the facts also adds hope but is not necessary.  This provides a criterion of justification which is conceptually intuitive and which has a long history of use in law, journalism and natural science.  Since our senses, testimony and memory are all hopeful, relying on hopefulness will not lead us to skepticism.  Practices which rely on mathematical and logical intuition are also hopeful, even if the sources themselves are only marginally hopeful.  The scientific practices which use and verify these intuitions grant them some a posteriori hope.  Many philosophical uses of metaphysical intuition must surely be hopeless, but conceptual intuition is hopeful to a greater extent, even though it is perhaps not so hopeful as perception or testimony.
^17	 	 This undermines Pust’s suggestion that we can run a skeptical argument with the same structure as [1] to [3] on epistemic propositions since there is no prima facie distinction between ethics, metaphysics and epistemology (2001, 236).  The distinction is that for epistemic propositions, at least viewed in this way, the existence of their truth-makers is part of the best explanation for the occurrence of the intuitions having them as content.  So the cognate of [2] is false.  Thus, the skeptical argument about epistemic intuitions fails.
^18	 	 Pust argues this line by claiming that the explanationist criterion lacks sufficient intuitive support and thus, since its evidence is primarily intuition, is inadequately supported by the evidence (2001, 245).  His claim is stronger than mine since he takes this lack of intuitive support to be universal, while I take it to be localised.  
^19	 	 See Liao for a careful analysis of various sorts of intuition conflicts (2008).  He suggests that genuine conflicts are not based on verbal disagreements, bias, emotion-clouded reasoning, mistaken heuristics or surface intuitions.  In such a situation, he finds it reasonable to permit each party to retain their intuition provided they realize that it may be false.  He obviously regards intuitions as about some universal or social concept, rather than as about personal concepts as I do.
^20	 	 Perhaps one fruitful area of research would be people’s propensities to defer to scientific explanations even when these conflict with their other sources of justification.  Of course, this experimentation would need to be careful to control for effects based on prestige and take into account the extra observations and instances of non-explanatory justification that science has access to, but even a cursory glance at contemporary Western society suggests that scientific explanation holds some public justificatory force.
